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Article

Remedies for Undocumented Noncitizens
in the Workplace: Using International
Law to Narrow the Holding of Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB
David Weissbrodt†
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) back-pay claims of a worker wrongfully discharged for
union organizing.1 The Supreme Court’s 2002 decision reasoned
that the worker should not be able to recover back pay under
the NLRA because he was a noncitizen and not entitled to employment.2 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Freedom of Association
Committee have rejected the Hoffman decision and criticized
the United States for its discrimination against noncitizens.3
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the ILO
Committee held that, while a noncitizen may not have the right
to enter the United States or to seek employment, once he has
been employed he is entitled to equal treatment with U.S.
workers regarding freedom of association and the right to or† Regents Professor and Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Natalie Woodward Kohner
for her assistance in preparing this Article and also thanks Mary Rumsey, Katherine Sewell, and Lisa Stratton for their comments and suggestions. Copyright © 2008 by David Weissbrodt.
1. 535 U.S. 137, 140–41 (2002).
2. Id. at 151.
3. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Advisory Op. OC-18/03, at 113 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_18_ing.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-18/03]; Int’l Labor Org. [ILO], Comm. on Freedom of Ass’n,
Complaints Against the Government of the United States Presented by the
American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) and the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), Report No. 332,
Case No. 2227, Vol. LXXXVI, 2003, Series B, No. 3 (Oct. 18, 2002).
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ganize trade unions.4 Since 2002, some U.S. courts have narrowed the application of Hoffman.5 Other courts have widened
the scope of the holding to prevent noncitizens from accessing
other forms of recovery.6 This Article examines how U.S. courts
have applied the Hoffman decision to employment cases under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Article argues that
interpreting Title VII through the lens of relevant treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, would render the decision in Hoffman inapplicable to
Title VII employment cases and would sufficiently narrow the
Hoffman decision to comply with the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights and the ILO decisions.
I. THE HOFFMAN DECISION AND THE RESPONSES OF
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS
The Court in Hoffman denied back pay to José Castro on
the basis of his noncitizen status. Courts have encountered difficulties applying Hoffman to subsequent cases concerning employment and labor rights of undocumented noncitizens. While
some courts have narrowed the holding in Hoffman, others
have broadened the decision and applied it to deny Title VII relief on the basis of the plaintiff’s immigration status. Two
prominent international bodies have examined the Hoffman
decision. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
ILO Committee on Freedom of Association both issued opinions
strongly critical of Hoffman.

4. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 106.
5. E.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 248–49
(2d Cir. 2006).
6. E.g., Oro v. 23 E. 79th St. Corp., 810 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (App. Div.
2005). The Supreme Court’s refusal to find undocumented noncitizens a suspect class may also hinder plaintiffs’ attempts to gain relief for discrimination
on the basis of their immigration status. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219
n.19 (1982); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 528 (6th Cir.
2007); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 415 (5th Cir. 2005); Vasquez-Velezmoro
v. INS, 281 F.3d 693, 697 (8th Cir. 2002). This difficulty may be less applicable
in Title VII cases because the discrimination alleged by the plaintiffs would be
based upon membership in another suspect class category (e.g., race, gender).
In that instance, courts are likely to rely on equal protection rights for undocumented noncitizens and find the plaintiffs entitled to relief. See Plyler, 457
U.S. at 215; Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 409 (6th Cir. 2003); Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 1991); Lynch v. Cannatella,
810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987).
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A. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in hiring, firing, compensation, or other terms and conditions of work.7 This Act provides individuals with several forms of relief if a court determines an employer discriminated against an employee. The
court may order “reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for
the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”8 Because the court cannot
legally compel the employer to rehire a noncitizen who has no
authorization to work in the United States,9 the court’s only option when the employer of a noncitizen has engaged in discrimination is to order back pay or other equitable relief.
B. HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC. V. NLRB
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., hired José Castro to mix
its products in 1988.10 At that time, Castro presented documents to the company indicating that he could legally work in
the United States.11 At a hearing in 1993, Castro testified that
he had been born in Mexico and was not legally authorized to
work in this country.12 Castro stated that he had borrowed
another person’s documentation when he began work at Hoffman in order to demonstrate legal authorization to work.13
In December 1988, Castro distributed authorization cards
to other workers as part of a unionization effort.14 Hoffman responded to Castro’s union activities by firing him in January
1989.15 In 1992, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
found that Hoffman had illegally fired Castro for his work with
the union and ordered the company to give Castro back pay as
relief.16 The Supreme Court vacated the NLRB’s award of back
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
Id. § 2000e-5(g).
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 140–41.
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pay, holding that awarding this type of remedy to an “illegal
alien[]” conflicted with the public policy goals of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).17 The Court reasoned that allowing back pay to noncitizens would both encourage and condone undocumented immigration to the United
States.18
The Court’s decision leaves many issues unresolved. While
this case involved an act of fraud by the undocumented worker,
the Court admits that the violation of IRCA can be caused by
the employer, since either “the undocumented alien tenders
fraudulent identification, which subverts the cornerstone of
IRCA’s enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly
hires the undocumented alien in direct contradiction of its IRCA obligations.”19 In instances where the employer is at fault,
the Court declined to address whether back pay may be appropriate.20 The policy reasoning of the decision could be used to
deny noncitizens other benefits that may induce them to seek
unauthorized employment in the United States.21 The decision
does not, however, mention any benefits or remedies other than
back pay under the NLRA. The decision does not even mention
the NLRB’s ability to award other remedies. Facing other undocumented workers’ employment claims, lower courts must
assess the breadth of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman.
C. THE DOMESTIC EFFECTS OF HOFFMAN
Several cases have addressed the application of the Hoffman decision to other labor contexts. Courts have considered
Hoffman’s effect outside the NLRA context and in cases where
employees seek relief other than back pay. Some courts have
narrowed its effects; others have used its reasoning more
broadly to limit noncitizen employees’ access to relief.
In Madeira v. Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc., the
Second Circuit allowed a noncitizen to receive monetary damages for workplace injuries, thus narrowing the Hoffman holding to apply solely to back-pay awards.22 Questions about the
17. Id. at 151; see also Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
18. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150.
19. Id. at 148.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 249 (2d Cir.
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broader applicability of Madeira persist due to the court’s reasoning. The Second Circuit allowed the award because New
York law explicitly included noncitizens in the list of eligible
workers and the Second Circuit was reluctant to use the
Court’s interpretation of IRCA to circumvent state law.23 In instances where state law does not explicitly include noncitizens,
the court’s ruling may be of little help in asserting a claim for
damages.
Courts have come to differing conclusions regarding Hoffman and discrimination complaints. In Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit found the reasoning in Hoffman inapplicable
to Title VII complaints.24 The court ordered relief under that
Act for a noncitizen whose employer violated the discrimination
prohibitions of Title VII.25 The contrary holding of the Fourth
Circuit in Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc.26 generates confusion concerning the application of Hoffman to discrimination
complaints. Decided prior to Hoffman, Egbuna relied on the
policies of IRCA in refusing to require employers to rehire an
undocumented worker.27
District courts and state courts have added to the uncertainty when interpreting the scope of Hoffman in an employment context. In Escobar v. Spartan Security Service, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas allowed the
plaintiff to seek relief under Title VII.28 That court’s reasoning
may not be widely applicable to the undocumented noncitizen
because the plaintiff subsequently acquired authorization to
work in the United States after suffering Title VII discrimination.29 In Mora v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, a
Pennsylvania state court allowed the suspension of weekly
wage benefits to an undocumented noncitizen injured on the
job.30 The court, however, required the defendant-employer to
2006).
23. Id. at 236; see also Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 315 F.
Supp. 2d 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that New York’s public policy does
not prohibit back pay for noncitizens injured at work); Safeharbor Employer
Servs. I, Inc. v. Velasquez, 860 So. 2d 984, 985–86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that the Florida legislature’s ability to allow workers’ compensation
benefits to noncitizens is not prohibited by Hoffman).
24. 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004).
25. Id. at 1061.
26. 153 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 1998).
27. Id. at 187.
28. 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
29. Id.
30. 845 A.2d 950, 954 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
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continue paying medical benefits.31 In Renteria v. Italia Foods,
Inc.,32 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed undocumented workers’ claims for back pay and compensatory damages to go forward under both the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193833 and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law.34
Other lower courts have widened their application of the
Hoffman holding. These courts have considered Hoffman relevant in various ways to workplace claims by noncitizens. In Oro
v. 23 East 79th Street Corp., the New York Appellate Division
held that a plaintiff can seek at trial to establish a claim for
lost earnings, but his immigration status may be the subject of
discovery and will be relevant to the amount of damages that
may be claimed.35 In Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., a Michigan
court permitted the defendant to suspend weekly wage benefits
under the state unemployment compensation law to an employee it had fired and then later learned was undocumented.36
The court held that because the employee committed a crime in
unlawfully seeking employment, the employer could suspend
weekly wage benefits.37 In Veliz v. Rental Service Corp. USA,
the District Court for the Middle District of Florida cited Hoffman in denying the plaintiff’s IRCA claim for lost wages since
he was an undocumented worker.38 Other courts have only allowed claims for lost wages in the amount the noncitizen could
expect to earn if working within his or her home nation.39 The
Superior Court of New Jersey held that Hoffman prevents undocumented noncitizens from receiving both economic and non-

31. Id. at 955.
32. No. 02 C 495, 2003 WL 21995190, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1940).
34. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/4(a) (2006).
35. Oro v. 23 E. 79th St. Corp., 810 N.Y.S.2d 779, 783 (App. Div. 2005).
36. 658 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
37. Id. at 520.
38. Veliz v. Rental Serv. Corp. USA, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336 (M.D.
Fla. 2003).
39. See, e.g., Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 1000 (N.H.
2004) (allowing the plaintiff ’s claim for lost earnings; maintaining that, in
most circumstances, lost earnings must be measured in the prevailing rate of
the plaintiff ’s home country, unless the employer knew or should have known
the employee’s undocumented status; and finding that an undocumented noncitizen’s status is relevant to the question of lost earnings and can be introduced by the defendant at trial); Sanango v. 200 E. 16th St. Hous. Corp., 788
N.Y.S.2d 314, 321 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that the injured plaintiff, who was
an undocumented noncitizen, could only receive back pay under the workers’
compensation law for the wages he would be able to earn in his home country).
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economic relief under Title VII for discriminatory termination
where the plaintiff was fired due to her pregnancy.40
D. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO HOFFMAN
Following the Hoffman decision, the government of Mexico
requested an advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights concerning the legality of depriving noncitizen workers of employment rights.41 The government was especially concerned with two potential implications of the Hoffman
decision. First, Mexico feared that migrant workers’ “vulnerability makes them an easy target for violations of their human
rights, based, above all, on criteria of discrimination and, consequently, places them in a situation of inequality before the
law as regards the effective enjoyment and exercise of these
rights.”42 Mexico was also concerned that Hoffman’s interpretation of national labor laws could allow for more widespread
abuse of noncitizens. As the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights explained, “This could encourage employers to use those
laws or interpretations to justify a progressive loss of other labor rights; for example: payment of overtime, seniority, outstanding wages and maternity leave, thus abusing the vulnerable status of undocumented migrant workers.”43 The court
determined that member states “may not subordinate or condition observance of the principle of equality before the law and
nondiscrimination to achieving their public policy goals, whatever these may be, including those of a migratory character.”44
The court’s opinion stressed that a member state could legally distinguish between undocumented and documented
workers. Once the employment relationship has begun, however, “the migrant acquires rights as a worker, which must be
recognized and guaranteed, irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the State of employment.”45 The court argued
that principles of equality and nondiscrimination are jus cogens
norms, applicable to all states, because
the State has the obligation to respect and guarantee the labor human rights of all workers, irrespective of their status as nationals or

40.
2004).
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Crespo v. Evergo Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 472 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 105–06.
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aliens, and not to tolerate situations of discrimination that are harmful to the latter in the employment relationships established between
private individuals (employer-worker).46

In addition, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association
issued a decision concerning Hoffman.47 The Committee, while
especially concerned about the effects of this case on unionization efforts, noted that removing back pay as a form of relief for
noncitizens could devastate worker safety and well-being.48 The
United States asserted that it had no international responsibilities under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work or ILO Conventions 87 (upholding the right of
workers to form labor unions) and 98 (establishing worker protections from acts of antiunion discrimination).49 The Committee, however, found the Hoffman decision so egregious as to violate the fundamental aims and principles behind the ILO
Constitution.50 The Committee stated that Hoffman harmed
the ILO’s ability to protect peace and social justice since it
functionally denied undocumented noncitizens in the United
States freedom to associate and join labor unions.51 The Committee stridently criticized the Supreme Court’s decision to
weigh the goals of the NLRA against the IRCA. “Human rights
cannot be abrogated to achieve policy goals,” the Committee
wrote, “but rather must always have priority over these goals.
Policy options must be formulated in compliance with basic
human rights standards.”52 The Committee recommended that
the United States create or amend legislation that would “bring
it into conformity with freedom of association principles, in full
consultation with the social partners concerned, with the aim of
ensuring effective protection for all workers against acts of antiunion discrimination in the wake of the Hoffman decision.”53

46. Id. at 113–14.
47. ILO, supra note 3.
48. Id. ¶ 565.
49. Id. ¶ 578; see also ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work, June 19, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233, 1237–38; ILO, Convention
(No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; ILO, Convention (No. 98) Concerning the
Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.
50. ILO, supra note 3, ¶ 600.
51. Id.
52. Id. ¶ 573.
53. Id. ¶ 612.

WEISSBRODT_4FMT

1432

5/24/2008 11:42 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[92:1424

II. EXTENDING THE HOLDING IN HOFFMAN TO
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION WOULD INCREASE
WORKPLACE ABUSES
Extending the Supreme Court’s holding in Hoffman to
preclude noncitizens from receiving relief under Title VII would
have several deleterious effects. At least seven million and as
many as twenty million noncitizens reside and work in the
United States without authorization.54 While these workers can
no longer receive back-pay remedies through the NLRA, they
may also be unable to receive back pay under Title VII as a remedy for employment discrimination.55 If Hoffman were extended to Title VII cases, noncitizens would face greater
threats in the workplace. Employers could use discovery to determine an individual’s immigration status.56 Noncitizens, fearing that discovery could lead to removal, would thus be deterred from reporting forbidden discrimination and abuse.57
Post-Hoffman, employer attempts to determine the immigration status of plaintiff-employees have drastically increased,
and employers have also attempted to intimidate current workers with these discoveries.58
Many noncitizens employed in the United States suffer abusive or exploitative working conditions. Migrants often receive
lower wages for dangerous work in agricultural and garment
manufacturing industries.59 Noncitizens are often employed in
54. Brad Knickerbocker, Illegal Immigrants in the U.S.— Just How
Many?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 16, 2006, at 1.
55. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
57. See Colindres v. Quietflex Mfg., No. H-01-4319, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27982, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (holding that the plaintiffs must provide lists of current employees who do not assert back pay or lost future wages
and the documents proving those persons’ legal authorization to work); Thorpe
v. City of New York, No. 116924/03, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3535, at *13 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2005) (granting the defendant additional discovery of the
plaintiff ’s identity and immigration status because the request was “material
and relevant” to the jury’s determination of whether to award lost earnings
based on wages the plaintiff may have earned in the United States). But see
EEOC v. Rest. Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (D. Minn. 2006) (denying discovery of the plaintiff ’s immigration status in a Title VII sexual harassment
and retaliation suit).
58. See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest
Law, 57 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2008).
59. Connie de la Vega & Conchita Lozano-Batista, Advocates Should Use
Applicable International Standards to Address Violations of Undocumented
Migrant Workers’ Rights in the United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 35, 41–43 (2005).
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sweatshops or held in forced labor camps within the United
States and its territories.60 Professors Connie de la Vega and
Conchita Lozano-Batista determined that these “workers often
work up to seven days a week for extremely low wages; 80-hour
working weeks are common; and the health and safety of workers . . . [are] constantly undermined. Additionally, workers
have no security of employment, and women are discriminated
against and harassed, sometimes sexually.”61 Employers who
hire noncitizens are less likely to comply with labor regulations, create safe working conditions, or provide security from
harassment and discrimination, because they are already violating the law by hiring undocumented noncitizens.62 Such
employers are “known for low wages, dangerous conditions, and
frequent violations of labor laws.”63
Extending the Hoffman decision to deny back-pay relief in
Title VII and other claims would further discourage noncitizens
from reporting abuse and discrimination by employers. Many
workers fear that filing a complaint could lead to retaliation resulting in removal or criminal prosecution.64 Employers could
threaten noncitizens with dismissal if they complain of discrimination or harassment. Employers have capitalized upon such
fears by exaggerating the holding in Hoffman and attempting
to deny other forms of recovery to noncitizens. For example,
[a] New York attorney representing a meat market owner in a dispute
over minimum wage wrote in a letter to a labor advocacy group, “I am
sure you are aware of the ruling by the Supreme Court of the United
States that illegal immigrants do not have the same rights as U.S. citizens.” The letter also maintained that after Hoffman, a fired worker
was not entitled to the difference between what he or she was paid
and minimum wage because those wages owed constitute backpay.65

60. Id. at 40, 43.
61. Id. at 43 (footnotes omitted).
62. See Sara R. Bollerup, Comment, America’s Scapegoats: The Undocumented Worker and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2004).
63. Sarah Cleveland et al., Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus
Curiae Brief: The United States Violates International Law When Labor Law
Remedies Are Restricted Based on Workers’ Migrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 795, 805 (2003).
64. See de la Vega & Lozano-Batista, supra note 59, at 42 (noting that
workers are afraid to report poor working conditions in part out of a “fear of
retaliation by employers”).
65. Christine Dana Smith, Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor: Hoffman and
the Future of Immigrants’ Workplace Rights, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 363, 374
(2003).
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In addition, many of these employees only learn about
their legal rights through their employers, furthering the employer’s ability to disseminate false and deleterious information
to noncitizens concerning their ability to access legal relief.66 If
courts bolster a wider reading of Hoffman, then employers will
have even more support for their attempts to further dissuade
employees from complaining. As the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association noted, “Eliminating the backpay remedy
grants carte blanche to employers to violate undocumented
workers’ rights with impunity, and discourages workers from
exercising their rights.”67
The consequences extend further. Not only are workers denied their rights, but as Michael Wishnie pointed out in his
amicus brief in the Hoffman proceedings, law-abiding companies are also harmed by competition with rogue employers who
hire undocumented noncitizens and then cut business costs by
refusing to pay minimum wages or maintain adequate safety
standards.68
III. APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO NARROW
HOFFMAN IN U.S. COURTS
Courts will undoubtedly face further cases concerning
whether Hoffman prevents undocumented noncitizens from receiving remedies for employment discrimination under Title
VII, workers’ compensation claims, and other employmentrelated problems. The extremely negative reaction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and the ILO should dissuade
U.S. courts from applying Hoffman to possibly analogous situations and should even encourage the Supreme Court to reconsider the balance it reached in Hoffman between the goals of
preventing unauthorized immigration and ensuring fairness in
the workplace.

66. Id. at 374 –75.
67. Cleveland et al., supra note 63, at 909.
68. Brief Amici Curiae of Employers and Employer Organizations in Support of Respondent at 4, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137
(2002) (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 1631729, at *4 (noting that one association’s
members “face unfair competition from contractors who ignore labor, health,
and safety standards”); see Catherine Fisk & Michael Wishnie, The Story of
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights Without Remedies
for Undocumented Immigrants, in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 438 (Laura J.
Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005).
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A. THE JUS COGENS NORM OF NONDISCRIMINATION
If a norm qualifies as jus cogens—that is, as a peremptory
norm of international law69—then a “controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision,”70 a contrary treaty, a reservation, or a persistent objection would not excuse U.S. violation
of that norm.71 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
recognizes and defines the concept of jus cogens as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”72 If a new peremptory norm of international law is identified, Article 64 of
the Vienna Convention declares “any existing treaty which is in
conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”73
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights determined
that the principle of nondiscrimination against noncitizens in
the workplace had risen to the status of jus cogens.74 The court
had three reasons to support that conclusion. First, the court
demonstrated that the principle of nondiscrimination was a
norm of general international law through locating it in several
treaties and other instruments.75 The court identified prohibitions against discrimination in the American Convention,76 the
Charter of the Organization of American States,77 the American Declaration,78 the International Covenant on Civil and Po69. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004).
70. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“[W]here there is no
treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.”).
71. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
72. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k (1987) (“Some rules of international law are
recognized by the international community of states as peremptory, permitting no derogation.”).
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 71, art. 64.
74. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 113.
75. Id. at 94.
76. Organization of American States [OAS], American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
77. Charter of the OAS, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3,
amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721
U.N.T.S. 324, amended by Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5, 1985,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 66, 25 I.L.M. 527, amended by Protocol of Washington, Dec. 4,
1985, 33 I.L.M. 1005, amended by Protocol of Managua, June 12, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 1009.
78. OAS, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948),
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litical Rights,79 and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.80 Second, the court stressed the duties of states to respect human rights since these rights inherently stem from
human dignity and are widely recognized within the relevant
treaties.81 Third, the court broadly interpreted the duty of
states to guarantee nondiscrimination, reasoning that discrimination included any “exclusion, restriction or privilege that is
not objective and reasonable, and which adversely affects human rights.”82 Preventing such discrimination had risen to the
status of jus cogens because discrimination would destroy other
jus cogens norms, such as equality before the law.83 The court
examined the effects of raising the norm of nondiscrimination
to the status of jus cogens and found it necessary in order to
preserve both international public order and the legal structure
of international law.84
United States courts, however, have been reluctant to apply jus cogens to cases involving claims by U.S. citizens or
against the U.S. government. Prior to 1988, no federal court
had considered the concept of jus cogens as a basis of its decision.85 By 1999, U.S. courts had only recognized rights under
jus cogens as applying to foreign governments and citizens,
principally under the Alien Tort Claims Act,86 but had never
recognized a cause of action for U.S. citizens against the U.S.
government based upon jus cogens.87
compiled in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM 17, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992).
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant].
80. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
81. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 92.
82. Id. at 95.
83. Id. at 99 (“Accordingly, this Court considers that the principle of
equality before the law, equal protection before the law[,] and nondiscrimination belongs to jus cogens, because the whole legal structure of national and international public order rests on it and it is a fundamental principle that permeates all laws.”).
84. Id.
85. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“So far as we know, no federal court has ever considered
the concept—much less the effect—of jus cogens.”).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also id. § 41 (1940) (codifying the original
Alien Tort Claims Act).
87. See Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1255 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (“There is no reported case of a court in the United States recogniz-
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United States courts have been reluctant to rule on cases
on the basis of jus cogens primarily due to the widespread disagreement concerning the methodology for identifying jus cogens
standards. Without a method to determine what norms qualify
as jus cogens, states also disagree on which principles have
achieved that status.88 In cases raising questions concerning
jus cogens, U.S. courts have relied on narrow definitions of
these norms. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 1988
described only two categories of jus cogens norms: “the principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of
force” and “fundamental human rights law that prohibits genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention,
and racial discrimination.”89 The D.C. Circuit later narrowed
that definition by relying upon the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States to limit potential jus
cogens violations to occasions when a state
practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave
trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d)
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f ) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.90

While the Restatement identifies “systematic racial discrimination” as a jus cogens violation, it is doubtful that courts
would consider other forms of discrimination (such as discrimination against noncitizens) as having achieved the status of jus
cogens. For example, while the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights argued that the principle of nondiscrimination
ing a cause of action under jus cogens norms of international law for acts
committed by United States government officials against a citizen of the United States.”), rev’d on other grounds, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2001).
88. These disagreements may stem from confusion concerning how to determine the status of various norms, along with widely differing perspectives
on both the basis for jus cogens status and which norms ought to achieve that
status. “[T]he extensive assertions of peremptory norms made by some writers
and international tribunals, without presenting any evidence to support the
claimed superior status of the norms under consideration, pose risks for the
international legal order and the credibility of the authors and tribunals.” Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
291, 292 (2006).
89. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar., 859 F.2d at 941 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmt. k (1987)).
90. Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 & cmt. n (1987) (defining those rights listed in section
702 as jus cogens principles)).
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is a jus cogens norm,91 it also conceded that the principle of
nondiscrimination is not universally accepted as jus cogens.92
B. APPLICATION OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS IN U.S. COURTS
Since courts have been reluctant to apply jus cogens within
the United States, the next step may be for claimants to ask
courts to require the United States to follow its treaty obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Before courts apply these
principles, they must first determine whether the holding in
Hoffman conflicts with those treaty obligations.
1. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Civil and Political Covenant), ratified by the United States in
1992, protects a wide range of rights, ranging from personal security to labor rights.93 Article 2 of the Covenant provides the
following framework for interpreting the scope of the other articles and broadly prohibiting discrimination:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.94

The prohibition of discrimination in Article 2 is further developed by Article 26:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
91. The Commission described the principle opposing racial discrimination as one that the “international community is unanimous in considering
that the prohibition of racial discrimination and of practices directly associated with it is an obligation erga omnes.” Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra
note 3, at 23.
92. Instead, the Commission suggested that some states have failed to codify norms of nondiscrimination: “The jus cogens nature of the principle of
non-discrimination implies that, owing to their peremptory nature, all States
must observe these fundamental rules, whether or not they have ratified the
conventions establishing them, because it is an obligatory principle of international common law.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Shelton, supra note 88, at
310 (discussing the Commission’s conclusion that the international community
had not yet reached consensus on prohibiting discrimination other than racial
discrimination).
93. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 79, arts. 8, 9.
94. Id. art. 2.
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shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.95

In its General Comment interpreting the Covenant, the
Human Rights Committee recognized that Article 2 was immediately required of all branches of government within the state.
If a state’s laws create distinctions between persons based on
national origin,
States Parties must refrain from violation of the rights recognized by
the Covenant, and any restrictions on any of those rights must be
permissible under the relevant provisions of the Covenant. Where
such restrictions are made, States must demonstrate their necessity
and only take such measures as are proportionate to the pursuance of
legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous and effective protection
of Covenant rights. In no case may the restrictions be applied or invoked in a manner that would impair the essence of a Covenant
right.96

2. The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination
The prohibitions concerning discrimination on the basis of
national origin are further elaborated in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention).97 The Race Convention, ratified by the
United States in 1994, prohibits discrimination relating to employment.98 The Convention defines racial discrimination very
broadly as
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise,
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public
life.99

Article 2 of the Convention requires parties to “prohibit
and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by

95. Id. art. 26.
96. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 6,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
97. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2, 660
U.N.T.S. 195.
98. See id. art. 5.
99. Id. art. 1.
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any persons, group or organization.”100 Article 5 further requires parties to undertake to guarantee, without racial discrimination, “[t]he rights to work, to free choice of employment,
to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against
unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favorable remuneration.”101 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also affirmed that parties must “[t]ake
measures to eliminate discrimination against non-citizens in
relation to working conditions and work requirements, including employment rules and practices with discriminatory purposes or effects.”102 It also clarified that parties must
“[r]ecognize that . . . all individuals are entitled to the enjoyment of labour and employment rights, including the freedom
of assembly and association, once an employment relationship
has been initiated until it is terminated.”103
The Race Convention and Civil and Political Covenant provide courts with two reasons to narrow or overturn Hoffman.
Courts, however, have been reluctant to apply treaty law domestically, often following the Senate declarations that the
treaties are non-self-executing and therefore cannot be enforced
by U.S. courts or utilized to create a private right of action.104
3. Applying Treaty Law in U.S. Courts
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that
a treaty ratified by the United States is part of the supreme
law of the land, equal in dignity to federal statutes:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.105

100. Id. art. 2.
101. Id. art. 5.
102. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation 30: Discrimination Against Non Citizens, ¶ 7.33, in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7/Add.1 (May 4, 2005).
103. Id. ¶ 7.35.
104. See White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (E.D. Wash. 1998); see
also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004); Igartúa-de la Rosa v.
United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
105. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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If a treaty and a federal statute conflict, the more recent
prevails.106 In this instance, the Civil and Political Covenant,
ratified in 1992, would predominate over the Labor Relations
Act of 1935,107 IRCA of 1984, and Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act—due to the “last-in-time” doctrine.108
Though the Constitution states that treaties are the supreme law of the land,109 the Supreme Court has developed a
doctrine that provides that only self-executing treaty provisions
are judicially enforceable or create a private right of action.110
Sometimes the rule is phrased in the alternative: treaty clauses
are enforceable if they are either self-executing or have been
implemented by legislation.111 The Supreme Court has declined
to find any provision of the Civil and Political Covenant or the
Race Convention to be self-executing.112 In Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, the Supreme Court bolstered its call for judicial restraint in applying the Civil and Political Covenant by citing
the Senate’s declaration in ratifying the treaty: “Several times,
indeed, the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal
courts the task of interpreting and applying international human rights law, as when its ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the document were not self-executing.”113
Courts are not bound by the Senate’s declaration on ratification because the task of interpreting treaties rests with the
courts.114 In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton explained that
“treaties of the United States to have any force at all, must be
considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import as
far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascer106. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Julian G.
Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 325 (2005).
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000).
108. While the United States has certainly updated immigration statutes
since the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, the Court’s decision in
Hoffman was based exclusively upon the policy rationale within the IRCA. See
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147–52 (2002).
109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
110. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 667 (1992); Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008).
111. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 667.
112. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
113. Id. at 728.
114. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 515, 531 (1991).
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tained by judicial determinations.”115 Under the Supremacy
Clause, courts maintain the privilege to treat treaties as they
do other forms of law, meaning that courts ought to be allowed
to both interpret and apply those provisions. Courts, however,
have so far been loathe to question the Senate’s declarations
that the Civil and Political Covenant and the Race Convention
are non-self-executing.116
C. USING INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN INTERPRETIVE TOOL IN
U.S. COURTS
Even if courts are not bound by the prohibition of discrimination against noncitizens as an arguably jus cogens norm and
as a provision of the Civil and Political Covenant and the Race
Convention, courts can still consider the extremely negative international response to Hoffman and the nondiscrimination
norm as it relates to U.S. statutes such as Title VII. United
States discrimination in employment against noncitizens has
persuaded the Mexican government to file a complaint in the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and to get a judgment
that opposes the U.S. practice.117 Further, in 2006, the U.N.
Human Rights Committee questioned the United States about
this decision when the United States filed its report under the
Civil and Political Covenant.118
The Hoffman Court weighed the objective of the immigration law to deter undocumented workers from entering the
United States against the desire of workers to organize unions.119 In its balancing analysis, the Court failed to take adequate account of the principle of nondiscrimination as emphasized by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Instead of
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
116. See, e.g., Igartúa-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150–51
(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (determining that neither the Constitution nor the
Civil and Political Covenant requires the United States to extend the right to
vote to citizens of Puerto Rico).
117. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 3, at 1–2.
118. See generally U.N. Human Rights Comm., List of Issues to Be Taken
up in Connection with the Consideration of the Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/3 (Apr. 26,
2006); see also International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 18–Mar. 7, 2008, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States of America, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (Feb. 2008).
119. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149–50
(2002).
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weighing the goals of preventing entry into the United States of
undocumented workers versus unionization rights, the Court
should weigh immigration policy versus both the right to organize and the principle of nondiscrimination. Even if U.S. courts
do not recognize nondiscrimination as a jus cogens norm,120 the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights decision should increase the attention courts pay to the precept of nondiscrimination in interpreting Title VII and other workplace issues.
In cases involving human rights, courts have often looked
to international law for evolving standards of legal protection.
For example, in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the Supreme Court determined that the principles of the law of nations should apply to the task of statutory interpretation since
“an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.”121 In
a case where the court must consider the IRCA prohibition on
the employment of undocumented noncitizens, the courts
should use the international norm against discrimination and
relevant treaty obligations as interpretive tools determining
both the extent of Title VII coverage and whether Hoffman
should be overturned.
The Supreme Court has even used this approach in interpreting the U.S. Constitution. In Atkins v. Virginia, Justice
John Paul Stevens, writing for himself and five other Justices,
relied in 2002 upon the fact that “within the world community,
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved”
and concluded that the execution of persons with mental retardation would offend civilized standards of decency in interpreting the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.122 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court
120. See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text (discussing the reluctance of U.S. courts to consider jus cogens norms).
121. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
122. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). The Court similarly
cited international norms in juvenile death penalty cases. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (acknowledging “the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (plurality opinion).
In 1989, then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated that, since “constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many [foreign] countries, it is time that
the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional
courts to aid in their own deliberative process.” William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul
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cited international protections for the right to privacy and nondiscrimination in declaring unconstitutional a state law prohibiting consensual sodomy between same-sex persons.123 “The
right the petitioners seek in this case,” said the Court, “has
been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many
other countries. There has been no showing that in this country
the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is
somehow more legitimate or urgent.”124 Following a similar approach, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in
Grutter v. Bollinger cited the Race Convention in support of an
international consensus for race-conscious affirmative action
programs.125
United States courts could use the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights decision as an interpretive or comparative tool,
as advocated by Justice Breyer:
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993). Other advocates have documented
the Supreme Court’s history of applying international law. See e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3–8, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 164151, at *3–8. The Court
has a significant history of considering international law. See, e.g., Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488–89 (1966) (comparing U.S. practice with that of India, Sri Lanka, and Scotland); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (delimiting the notion of privacy in the home by looking to
“common understanding throughout the English-speaking world”); Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155, 167 (1955) (finding the practice of allowing a witness to object “supported by long-standing tradition here and in other Englishspeaking nations”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (holding
that the Due Process Clause obliges courts to ascertain whether laws offend
“those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples”); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The safeguards of ‘due process of law’ and ‘the
equal protection of the laws’ summarize the history of freedom of Englishspeaking peoples . . . .”); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366
(1916) (explaining that a constitution embodies “‘only relatively fundamental
rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities’”
(quoting Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903))).
123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
124. Id. at 577. The Supreme Court cited to a decision of the European
Court of Human Rights, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981),
as persuasive authority when it held that a Texas law criminalizing homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional. Id. at 573; id. at 576 (“Other nations, too,
have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.”); Harold Hongju
Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 50–55
(2004).
125. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights Law Perspective on
Grutter and Gratz, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 275, 276–77 (2004) (examining Justice Ginsburg’s use of international law).
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These growing institutional and substantive similarities [between the
U.S. and other nations] are important because to a degree they reflect
a common aspiration—a near-universal desire for judicial institutions
that, through guarantees of fair treatment, help to provide the security necessary for investment and, in turn, economic prosperity.
Through their respect for basic human liberty, they may help to make
that liberty a reality.126

Following this comparative approach, the Court would value Title VII’s remedies to deter discrimination over immigration policies because of the status given to nondiscrimination in
international court decisions and treaties.
CONCLUSION
In Hoffman, the Supreme Court refused to allow undocumented noncitizens to obtain back-pay remedies for an illegal
firing stemming from their unionization activities. In the six
years since that decision, U.S. courts have appeared confused
about the reach of the Hoffman decision and what employment
remedies are foreclosed to undocumented noncitizens. Two
prominent international adjudication bodies have criticized the
Hoffman decision in opinions stressing the necessary protections of labor rights and the primary status of nondiscrimination.
In addition, both the Civil and Political Covenant and the
Race Convention have provisions that conflict with Hoffman. In
challenges to Hoffman, U.S. courts may be reluctant to rely
upon either a new application of jus cogens or treaty provisions
that may not be self-executing. Nonetheless, the principles elaborated by the Supreme Court in Charming Betsy and applied
by judges in Atkins, Grutter, Lawrence, and other decisions
might assist courts in using international decisions and treaty
provisions against discrimination as interpretive tools to avoid
further discrimination against undocumented employees in the
workplace.

126. Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Keynote
Address at the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law Proceedings: Conflict and Coordination Across International Regimes
(Apr. 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 267 (2003).

